Ukraine situation requires flexibility

Simmer down.
That’s our advice to those in Congress and the chattering classes when it comes to Ukraine. Saber-rattling and heated rhetoric may win a few headlines, but they’re not really helpful at this point.
Russia’s move into Crimea — which is likely to be permanent no matter how loudly the West howls — cannot be condoned. But it can be understood from a Russian perspective.
In fact, the wonder isn’t that Russia has asserted control over the region but that it ever let go of it in the first place.
Crimea was viewed as part of imperial Russia under the tsars as far back as the 18th century. For historical as well as sentimental and nationalistic reasons, ordinary Russians have long thought of it as Mother Russia’s soil.
But like everything is the post-Soviet world, Crimea is incredibly complicated. In 1954, Nikita Krushchev decided to give it to Ukraine back when they were both part of the U.S.S.R. Then, when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia missed an opportunity to pull Crimea back within its orbit.
In 1944, Stalin came to the conclusion that about 200,000 ethnic Tatars in Crimea were collaborating with Hitler and the Nazis. He expelled all of them to Central Asia, shipped in Russians, and let the Russians take over the property, land and businesses left behind by the Tatars.
After the Soviet collapse in 1991, the descendants of those expelled Tatars started moving back to Crimea. Today, they amount to about 12 percent of the 2 million people living there. Under the circumstances, it’s understandable the relationship between the Tatars and the Russians is tense and testy.
To further complicate matters, the Tatars are Sunni Muslims, while the Russians are Orthodox Christians, at least by tradition.
Armchair generals and dimestore diplomats like to point out ethnic Ukrainians are a majority in the western part of Ukraine, while Russians are a majority in the eastern part. The implication is some sort of partition or division might make sense.
But — again — it’s not that simple. The extent of the majority is often slim, something like 53 percent, and it’s often divided between rural and urban populations.
In the eastern region of Kharvik, for example, there is a slim Russian majority. But the capital city of Kharvik is overwhelmingly Russian, while the countryside around it is overwhelmingly Ukrainian.
And any military calculus runs into similar complications.
While Ukraine has troops in bases all over the country, in recent years the government has taken to posting troops near their home communities. In other words, the troops in largely Ukrainian regions tend to be mostly Ukrainian. In largely Russian regions, they tend to be mostly Russian.
All of this is a way of saying this is going to take some time to sort itself out. Sure, it’s going to take firmness on the part of the U.S. and the European Union. But there are limits to what can and cannot be done.
It’s going to take flexibility as well, and overheated rhetoric can make it tougher to be flexible.
One example of possible flexibility would be for the European Union to allow Ukraine to be part of trade agreements with both Europe and Russia’s trade network. Some analysts argue that by making it an either-or choice, the EU helped provoke the crisis.
What’s not helpful at this point is tough guy talk from the sidelines.
It’s worth noting this week marked the 11th anniversary of the beginning of the war in Iraq, a war based upon dubious premises, oversimplified assumptions and an ignorance of the complexities of that part of the world.
One wonders if we’ve learned any lessons from that. — J.R.[[In-content Ad]]